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ABSTRACT 
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In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled in Kelo v. City of New London that government 
use of eminent domain laws to promote economic development was allowed under the 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court’s majority emphasized, however, 
states were not barred from restricting this particular use of eminent domain. Within a 
very short time, more than half of the states heeded the Court’s suggestion, but others 
did not. This project explains why state reaction to Kelo varied by looking at the effects 
of state population demographics, political ideology, and legislative partisan 
composition and unity. The influence of these factors on the content, and thus the 
strength, of the legislation enacted is also addressed. Finally, state reaction is evaluated 
within the context of the intense criticism generated by the decision as well as the 
emerging property rights movement.  
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INTRODUCTION: AN INVITATION TO THE STATES1 
In Susette Kelo, et al., Petitioners v. City of New London, Connecticut, et al., 
Susette Kelo and a group of fellow homeowners in the blue-collar neighborhood of Fort 
Trumbull appealed a Connecticut Supreme Court decision permitting the City of New 
London’s exercise of eminent domain to transfer the land in the Fort Trumbull area to a 
private developer. The redevelopment plan called for the construction of a waterfront 
hotel, a conference center, office spaces, and condominiums that would replace Fort 
Trumbull’s older homes and businesses in order to accommodate a new research center 
for the Pfizer pharmaceutical company, generate higher tax revenues for the city, and 
create new jobs (Rubin and Barrett 2005).  
On September 28, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case to decide 
whether the government has the authority to exercise eminent domain for the sole 
purpose of economic development. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
allows private property to be taken for “public use” provided that the owners receive 
“just compensation.” On June 23, 2005, the Court ruled 5-4 that the City of New 
London’s proposed condemnations qualified as a “public use” within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment (Rubin and Barrett 2005). 
Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens asserted that “promoting 
economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of government.” The 
Court’s decision simply affirmed “over a century of case law interpreting [the Fifth 
Amendment].”  However, Justice Stevens emphasized that “nothing in [the Court’s] 
                                                 
1 This thesis follows the style and format of the American Political Science 
Association’s Style Manual for Political Science.  
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opinion precludes any state from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings 
power.” He also noted that “the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to 
promote economic development are certainly matters of legitimate public debate.” 
(Legal Information Institute 2005) 
Justice Stevens’ acknowledgement that states can limit the use of eminent 
domain raises the question whether the states responded to the Justice’s suggestion. This 
project investigates this question and explores what factors led the states to act 
differently. Thus, the project is organized about three principal questions: 
(1) Did the states react to Kelo? 
(2) If so, how did the states react to Kelo? 
(3) What explains the variations in the states’ reactions to Kelo? 
A state is considered having reacted to Kelo if its legislature enacted legislation limiting 
the use of eminent domain in the year and a half following the Court’s decision. How a 
state reacted is evaluated according to the content of the legislation. The state 
characteristics affecting whether and how a state reacted are determined by the 
construction of a statistical model.  
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THE COURT RULED: DID THE STATES REACT? 
The project’s first question asks whether the states reacted to Kelo by enacting 
legislation limiting the exercise of eminent domain. The National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) is a bipartisan organization that tracks state legislation according to 
issue areas. The NCSL has cataloged state legislation limiting the exercise of eminent 
domain from July 2005 to December 2006. The NCSL’s official website provides 
summaries of the legislation as well as links to the state legislatures’ official databases 
where full-text versions of the legislation are available. Based on the NCSL’s summaries 
and after double-checking the full-text versions of the legislation, it was determined that 
thirty states reacted to Kelo by enacting legislation limiting the exercise of eminent 
domain. The legislation took two forms. Some state legislatures passed statutes that were 
subsequently signed by the governor while others passed constitutional amendments that 
were approved by voters in the 2006 election. A few states in addition to enacting 
statutes also passed constitutional amendments. The following table shows the states that 
reacted to Kelo. (Note: A more detailed table of the states’ reactions appears in the 
appendix.)  
 
Table 1: States that Enacted Legislation in Reaction to Kelo 
States that Enacted Statutes Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
States that Enacted 
Constitutional Amendments   
Louisiana, Michigan, South Carolina 
States that Enacted Statutes and 
Constitutional Amendments 
Florida, Georgia, New Hampshire 
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THE COURT RULED: HOW DID THE STATES REACT? 
Given that three-fifths of the states reacted to Kelo by enacting legislation 
limiting the exercise of eminent domain, the project’s second question concerns the 
substance of the limitations. The NCSL has identified seven nonexclusive categories of 
legislation limiting the exercise of eminent domain. The categories are: (1) prohibition of 
eminent domain for economic development, (2) explicit definition of blight and 
restriction of eminent domain to blighted properties, (3) limitations to public use, (4) 
revising the eminent domain process, (5) revamping methods of compensation, (6) 
imposing a moratorium on the use of eminent domain, and (7) the formation of a study 
committee.  
Legislation in the “prohibition for economic development” category reaffirms 
that the exercise of eminent domain is limited to only “public uses” and that it cannot be 
used to increase tax revenue or to transfer property to another private entity. Legislation 
in the “blight” category restricts the exercise of eminent domain to blighted property 
and/or redefines what constitutes a blighted property, accentuating detriment to public 
health and safety. The “public use” category includes legislation that limits the exercise 
of eminent domain to only acceptable “public uses” that involve the possession, 
occupation, or enjoyment of property by the public at large or public agencies. The 
“process” category includes laws that are less restrictive but impose new procedural 
requirements such as greater public notice, more public hearings, negotiation in good 
faith, or approval by elected governing bodies before eminent domain can be exercised 
for any reason. The category concerning “compensation” involves laws that raise the 
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costs to governments when they exercise eminent domain for economic development. 
These laws require that property owners be awarded more than one hundred percent of 
the value of their property if governments condemn it for economic development, which 
presumably will deter the use of eminent domain for this purpose. Legislation in the 
“moratorium” category places a temporary moratorium on the exercise of eminent 
domain for economic development. The legislation in the “study committee” category is 
the least restrictive and is perhaps little more than a symbolic gesture; this legislation 
creates a study committee to investigate the state’s exercise of eminent domain then 
report back to the legislature with recommendations.  
After several careful readings, the legislation enacted in reaction to Kelo was 
classified according to the NCSL’s seven categories. The greatest number of states 
enacted legislation with the “prohibition for economic development” provision followed 
by the “blight” provision. Only Ohio enacted legislation with the “moratorium” and 
“study committee” provisions. The following table shows how the states enacted 
legislation according to the NCSL’s seven categories.  
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Table 2: Categories of Legislation that States Enacted in Reaction to Kelo 
Prohibition of Eminent Domain for 
Economic Development 
Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,  
New Hampshire, South Carolina,  
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin 
Explicit Definition of Blight and 
Restriction of Eminent Domain to 
Blighted Properties 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,  
South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin 
Limitations to Public Use Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota,  
New Hampshire, Tennessee, West Virginia 
Revising the Eminent Domain Process Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Utah, West Virginia 
Revamping Methods of Compensation Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri 
Imposing a Moratorium on the Use of 
Eminent Domain 
Ohio  
Formation of a Study Committee Ohio 
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A MODEL OF THE STATES’ REACTIONS TO KELO 
Having determined that thirty states reacted to Kelo, the project’s final question 
addresses what state characteristics affected whether and how a state reacted. The state 
characteristics considered in the project include: the demographics of the state, the 
ideological orientation of the state, and the partisan unity and composition of the state. 
To test the relationships between these state characteristics and whether and how a state 
reacted, the following model was developed.   
 
Figure 1: State Characteristics and Reaction  
 
 
 
State Reaction to 
Kelo 
Partisan 
Composition of 
National 
Delegation 
State 
Demographics 
Ideological 
Orientation of 
State 
Partisan Unity of 
State 
Government 
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The dependent variables for the analysis based on this model parallel the first two 
questions: (1) “Legislation Enacted” and (2) “Strength of Legislation.” These variables 
were constructed with the information displayed in Table 1 and Table 2.   
For “Legislation Enacted,” states that enacted legislation were coded “1” while 
those states that did not react to Kelo were coded “0.”  
For “Strength of Legislation,” the sample size declined from fifty to thirty states; 
only the states that enacted legislation were included in this variable. States that enacted 
legislation with both the “prohibition for economic development” and “blight” 
provisions were coded “1” as this was considered the “strongest” legislation. States that 
enacted just one of these provisions or any other combination of the other five provisions 
were coded “0” as this was considered “weaker” legislation. See the appendix for an 
explanation of how the “strongest” and “weaker” distinctions were determined.  
Four indicators of the state characteristics shown in the preceding model are the 
four independent variables in the analysis. The first characteristic “State Demographics” 
was measured according to the percentage of the state’s population that was “white 
persons not Hispanic” in 2004. This data is available online from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s State & County QuickFacts. The percentage of the state’s population that was 
“white persons not Hispanic” ranges from 23.3% in Hawaii to 96.1% in Maine.  
The second characteristic “Ideological Orientation of State” was measured 
according to the percentage of the state’s population that was conservative in 2003. “To 
assess the relative differences in state ideology across space and over time,” political 
scientists Gerald C. Wright, Robert S. Erickson, and John P. McIver have developed a 
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measure of state ideology “based on the aggregation of national CBS/New York Times 
public opinion surveys at the state level.” They originally drew on surveys taken 
between 1976 and 1988 and produced cross-sectional measures of state ideology; more 
recently, they have drawn on additional polling data to further disaggregate state-year 
estimates of ideology (Brace et al. 2004, 531). The state ideology estimates for 2003 
were used in this study and can be downloaded from Wright’s website. The 
“conservativeness” of the states’ populations ranges from 23.6% in Wyoming to 58.3% 
in South Dakota.  
The indicator for the third characteristic “Partisan Unity of State Government” 
was constructed from information obtained about the political affiliation of the 
governors and state legislators in the 2006 edition of The Book of the States. For this 
variable, states were coded “1” if the political affiliation of the governor and the 
majorities in both the state house and senate were Republican; states were coded “0” if 
either the governor or the majority in the state house or senate was Democratic. A little 
over a fifth of the states have unified Republican governments.  
The indicator for the fourth characteristic “Partisan Composition of National 
Delegation” addresses Republican Party dominance in each of the state delegations 
elected to the U.S. House of Representatives for the 109th U.S. Congress (in session 
throughout 2005 and 2006); the measure is the percentage of Republican U.S. 
Representatives in the state delegations. The percentage ranges from zero to one 
hundred. This information is available from the official website of the Office of the 
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Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. (Note: A table of the variable measures for 
each state appears in appendix.) 
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AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MODEL 
An initial logistic statistical analysis was performed because the first dependent 
variable – whether a state enacted legislation – is dichotomous. The following table 
presents the results of this analysis.   
 
Table 3: Results for Dependent Variable “Legislation Enacted” 
Concepts and Variables Expected b p 
Demographics of State    
    % Population White, Not Hispanic + 0.073 0.017 
Ideological Orientation of State    
    % Conservative Wright + 0.048 0.365 
Partisan Unity of State Government    
    Republican Unified State Government  + 2.342 0.049 
 Partisan Composition of National Delegation    
    % Republican U.S. Representatives + 2.270 0.094 
Model Diagnostics     
   Number of Cases 48* 
   Percent Correctly Predicted 75.0 
   Negelkerke R Square 0.397 
*Wright ideology scores are not available for Alaska and Hawaii.   
 
 Overall, the model correctly classified 75.0% of the states. Three of the four 
independent variables are statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction. 
Reactions to Kelo were most likely to have occurred in states with predominantly white 
populations. States with unified Republican governments and high percentages of 
Republicans in their delegations to the U.S. House of Representatives were also more 
likely to have responded to the Court’s decision. With a p-value of 0.017, the percentage 
white of a state’s population is most likely related to whether the state enacted 
legislation. With a p-value of 0.365, the percentage conservative of a state’s population 
has no statistically significant impact on whether the state enacted legislation. The 
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following charts illustrate the positive relationships between the statistically significant 
independent variables and the probability that legislation was enacted. As the proportion 
white, the Republican control of state government, and the proportion of Republican 
U.S. Representatives vary from their minimum to maximum values, the probability that 
legislation was enacted increases. In the construction of each chart, the other continuous 
variables were held constant at their mean and the other categorical variables were held 
constant at their median.   
 
Figure 2: The Positive Relationship between “% Population White, Not Hispanic” 
and the Probability that a State Enacted Legislation 
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Figure 3: The Positive Relationship between “Republican Unified State 
Government” and the Probability that a State Enacted Legislation 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The Positive Relationship between “% Republican U.S. Representatives” 
and the Probability that a State Enacted Legislation 
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Another logistic statistical analysis was performed because the second dependent 
variable is also dichotomous. The following table presents the results when the 
dependent variable is the substance or strength of the legislation enacted by those states 
that reacted to Kelo. 
 
Table 4: Results for Dependent Variable “Strength of Legislation” 
Concepts and Variables Expected b p 
Demographics of State    
    % Population White, Not Hispanic + 0.055 0.143 
Ideological Orientation of State    
   % Conservative Wright + -0.043 0.488 
Partisan Unity of State Government    
   Republican Unified State Government  + 0.460 0.637 
Partisan Composition of National Delegation    
   % Republican U.S. Representatives  + 1.941 0.246 
Model Diagnostics     
   Number of Cases 29* 
   Percent Correctly Predicted 62.1 
   Negelkerke R Square 0.147 
*Wright ideology score is not available for Alaska.  
 
None of the p-values for the four independent variables are statistically 
significant. They range from 0.143 for “% Population White, Not Hispanic” to 0.637 for 
“Republican Unified State Government.” Thus, none of the independent variables can 
consistently predict whether a state enacted strong or weak legislation.  
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A SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF WHY AND HOW THE STATES REACTED 
At the start of the project, it was found that thirty of the fifty states reacted to 
Kelo by enacting legislation limiting the exercise of eminent domain. Considering that 
the Court’s decision generated immediate, widespread criticism and occurred within the 
context of a nationwide property rights movement, this reaction makes sense.  
According to the Institute for Justice, the libertarian public interest law firm that 
represented Susette Kelo and her fellow Fort Trumbull homeowners, “the public reaction 
to the Kelo decision by the Supreme Court [was] widespread and nearly unanimous in its 
outrage.” (2005a) The Washington Post columnist Kenneth Harney declared: “To call it 
a backlash would hardly do it justice. Calling it an unprecedented uprising to nullify a 
decision by the highest court in the land would be more accurate.”  
“Instant polls on national news websites show[ed] widespread opposition to 
eminent domain for private economic development.” An MSNBC.com poll reported 
ninety-eight percent public opposition to Kelo and a CNN.com poll reported ninety-nine 
percent public opposition to Kelo (Institute for Justice 2005a). Negative letters flooded 
newspapers across the country. Typical of the letters published was that of law professor 
Steve Calandrillo in the June 25 edition of the New York Times. Calandrillo wrote: “The 
Supreme Court's decision … is a devastating blow to property rights all over America … 
As it now stands, we are badly shortchanging homeowners, who have long relied on 
property rights that this decision seems to hopelessly erode.” More than 300 protestors 
gathered for a rally in New London demanding: “Let the homeowners stay.” (Institute 
for Justice 2005a) Throughout the country, membership in the Institute for Justice’s 
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Castle Coalition nearly tripled (Institute for Justice 2005a). According to its official 
website, the Castle Coalition is “a nationwide grassroots property rights activism 
project.” The Castle Coalition promotes awareness of eminent domain abuse and holds 
training sessions and offers support to those communities directly threatened by the 
exercise of eminent domain for economic development. 
Kelo became the rallying cry of a property rights movement that was launched 
twenty years earlier with the publication of Richard Epstein’s Takings: Private Property 
and the Power of Eminent Domain. In Takings, Epstein contends that there is a natural 
right to property ownership based on the philosophy of John Locke. Property ownership 
consists of a bundle of rights, of which possession, use, and disposition are the most 
important. Government interference with any right in the bundle, or the bundle itself, is a 
taking that must be compensated (Kendall and Lord 1998, 519).  
Inspired by Epstein’s ideas and concerned about the increasing federal and state 
regulation of business and property during the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan’s 
Administration looked to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to put “a severe 
brake” upon these regulations and to facilitate “a restoration of economic liberty.” 
(Kendall and Lord 1998, 529) President Reagan appointed conservative activist judges 
to the three courts that control federal takings law – the U.S. Supreme Court, the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Court of Federal Claims (Kendall and Lord 1998, 
530). During and beyond his Presidency, these judges have awarded compensation when 
partial or total takings have infringed on any or all of the property rights of possession, 
use, and disposition. Many who served in the Reagan Administration have continued to 
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promote the belief that ownership of private property is critical to individual liberty 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Through involvement in organizations such as the 
Institute for Justice, the Pacific Legal Foundation, and the Federalist Society, former 
Reagan officials have trained lawyers and judges in how to protect property rights; they 
have also initiated litigation and lobbied for legislation against “abuses of eminent 
domain.” (Hatcher 2005; Kendall and Lord 1998) 
The proponents of the property rights movement were instrumental in bringing 
important property rights cases before the Supreme Court in the years preceding Kelo. A 
table of some of these cases appears in the appendix. Most of the time, property rights 
advocates were successful in utilizing the judiciary to further their agenda. In Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., Hodel v. Irving, and Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, the Court declared that each of the critical strands in the bundle of 
property rights – the right to exclude others from, dispose of, and use property – is 
protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Dana and Merrill 2002; 
Kendall and Lord 1998). In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City 
of Tigard, the “nexus” and “rough proportionality test” were established to ensure that 
“the means used by federal, state, and local governments to achieve their regulatory 
objectives are closely tailored to achieve permissible ends.” (Kendall and Lord 1998, 
580) Governments, in other words, could not exploit their takings powers to advance 
their own interests. However, in 2002, the Court did rule that a temporary moratorium on 
new development did not constitute a taking requiring the payment of compensation in 
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Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (Dana and 
Merrill 2002, 270).  
Thus, the intense negative reaction of the public and the activity of property 
rights advocates (probably escalated having been dealt two recent judicial setbacks in 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and Kelo) could have induced the states to react to 
Kelo. The following three charts illustrate these forces graphically. The first two charts 
trace the mentions of “eminent domain” in major newspapers and magazines and 
journals from 1985 to 2005. The information used to construct these charts was obtained 
from a LexisNexis search of “eminent domain” in the headlines, lead paragraphs, and 
terms in the “general news” of “major papers” and “magazines and journals” from 
January 1, 1985 to December 31, 2005. They show that the public’s attention to 
“eminent domain” spiked in 2005 when Kelo was decided. As the earlier discussion 
suggests, it can be hypothesized that this attention was negatively disposed to the 
Court’s ruling. The third chart traces the mentions of “eminent domain” in legal 
periodicals and books from 1985-2004. While the 2005 edition of the Index to Legal 
Periodicals and Books was not yet available at this writing, this chart shows increased 
discourse about the exercise of eminent domain within the legal community from 1985 
onward. Whether the property rights movement was the impetus for such discussion or 
not, increasing attention to eminent domain assured a prominent place for property rights 
proponents in the years leading up to Kelo.   
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Figure 5: “Eminent Domain” Mentions in Major Papers from 1985-2005 
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Figure 6: “Eminent Domain” Mentions in Magazines and Journals from 1985-2005 
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Figure 7: “Eminent Domain” Mentions in Legal Periodicals and Books  
from 1985-2004 
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Having explored why the states reacted to Kelo, it makes sense that the states 
reacted to Kelo by enacting legislation limiting the exercise of eminent domain because 
the U.S. House of Representatives reacted to Kelo by passing legislation and the Institute 
for Justice’s Castle Coalition urged the states to do so.  
Just one week after the Court announced its decision, the House passed House 
Resolution 340 which “disagree[d] with the majority opinion in Kelo.” The resolution 
asserted that state and local governments should never use eminent domain to advantage 
one private property over another and should not construe Kelo as justification to abuse 
the power of eminent domain. Additionally, “Congress maintain[ed] the prerogative and 
reserve[ed] the right to address through legislation any abuses of eminent domain by 
state and local government in light of the ruling in Kelo.” The resolution passed 
overwhelmingly 365 to 33 (Library of Congress 2005a). 
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 On November 3, 2005, the House passed H.R. 4128, or the Private Property 
Protection Act of 2005. “The bill denies, for two fiscal years, economic development 
funds to state and local governments that use eminent domain for private commercial 
development.” “It also directly prohibits the federal government from using eminent 
domain for private development.”(Institute for Justice, 2005b) It too passed by an 
overwhelming majority of 376 to 38 (Library of Congress 2005b). 
Shortly after Kelo was decided, the Castle Coalition launched a $3 million 
“Hands Off My Home” campaign, “an aggressive initiative to affect significant and 
substantial reforms of state and local eminent domain laws.” The “Hands Off My Home” 
campaign encouraged governors, state legislators, and municipal officials to sign the 
“Hands Off My Home” pledge which reads: “I pledge to the citizens of this State that I 
will: Oppose efforts by my state government or municipalities within my state to use the 
government power of eminent domain for private development. Support legislation and 
other efforts to ensure that citizens of this State are safe from eminent domain for private 
development.” (The Castle Coalition 2007) The Castle Coalition also posted sample 
legislation on its official website, instructing legislators in the language of bills that 
prohibit eminent domain for economic development, redefine blight and public use, 
increase process, and place a moratorium on the exercise of eminent domain for 
economic development. 
Thus, in order to not risk reprimand by the U.S. Congress for “abuses of eminent 
domain” and to avoid losing federal economic development funds, the states had good 
reason to enact legislation limiting the exercise of eminent domain. With their 
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mobilization of voters to contact legislators about the “Hands Off My Home” pledge and 
their sample legislation, the Castle Coalition facilitated the states enacting legislation 
limiting the exercise of eminent domain.  
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A SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL 
When a model of the states’ reactions to Kelo was constructed, it was determined 
that the indicators for the demographics of a state, the partisan unity of the state 
government, and the partisan composition of the state’s national delegation were 
positively related to whether the state enacted legislation. Also, there was no statistically 
significant relationship between the ideological orientation of a state and whether the 
state enacted legislation.  
It makes sense that states with unified Republican governments and higher 
percentages of Republican U.S. Representatives had a greater probability of enacting 
legislation than states where Democrats were stronger either in the state government or 
the U.S. House of Representatives. Of the country’s two primary political parties, the 
GOP is the principal proponent of the property rights movement.  
Evidence of GOP concerns regarding property rights can be found in the party’s 
national platforms which since the 1988 presidential election have all included a specific 
section devoted to property rights. In 1988, the Republican Party declared that “the right 
of private property is the cornerstone of liberty … it safeguards for citizens everything of 
value, including their right to produce and sell goods and services.” In subsequent 
platforms, the party emphasized its support for “strong enforcement” of the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For the past twenty years, Republican Party leaders 
have “spearheaded efforts to protect private property rights” and “oppose[d] efforts to 
diminish the rights of private citizens to the [property] they own.” In contrast, 
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Democratic Party platforms for each of the five presidential elections since 1988 were 
silent on this issue (Woolley and Peters 2007). 
Furthermore, many officials from Republican Administrations, particularly the 
Reagan Administration, have gone on to found or assume prominent roles in the myriad 
of groups propelling the property rights movement. Generally conservative or 
libertarian, some of these groups are dedicated entirely to the property rights movement 
while others are engaged in a range of civil issues. One such group is the Institute for 
Justice, which litigated on behalf of Susette Kelo and her fellow Fort Trumbull 
homeowners. A review of the parties that filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of Kelo 
reveals many key contributors to the property rights movement – among them, the 
Pacific Legal Foundation, the Mountain States Legal Foundation, and the Property 
Rights Foundation of America. Other important property rights proponents include the 
Federalist Society and the Cato Institute (Hatcher 2005; Kendall and Lord 1998). Brief 
descriptions of these groups are located in the appendix.  
While all the groups are unique in their specific missions, they are alike in their 
“conservative” character. Thus, returning to the project, it is surprising that there was no 
statistically significant relationship between the percentage conservative of a state’s 
population and its probability of enacting legislation. The ideological orientation of the 
states was measured with several different versions of state ideology, but none of the 
results for this variable were statistically significant. Thus, quite unexpectedly, it must be 
concluded based on the model in this study that whether a state was ideologically 
conservative was unrelated to its reaction to Kelo.  
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Equally surprising are the results for the state demographic variable: states with 
proportionately larger white populations were more likely to have reacted to Kelo than 
states with proportionately smaller white populations. Due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the theoretical rationale for this variable’s strong performance, the model 
was re-run with an alternative measure based on median household income drawn from 
the 2005 American Community Survey (available online from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
American Factfinder). However, even when this “income variable” was included in the 
analysis, the white percentage of a state’s population remained statistically significant.  
In the search for an explanation as to why the white percentage of a state’s 
population impacted whether or not the state enacted legislation, legal scholar David A. 
Dana’s “The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after Kelo” 
provides some insight. Dana argues that “‘reform’ efforts in the law of eminent domain 
have largely focused on economic development condemnations in middle-class areas, 
and not blight condemnations in poor areas.” He notes that the two eminent domain 
cases that “spawned the greatest public outrage” both involved middle-class areas – Fort 
Trumbull in Kelo and the “lower-middle class, largely European immigrant” Poletown 
neighborhood in Detroit in the 1980 Michigan Supreme Court case Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit. In contrast, the public, the media, and 
legislators “quietly approved or at least accepted” the ruling in the 1954 Supreme Court 
case Berman v. Parker which allowed blight condemnations in poor areas (2006, 5). 
Dana thus suggests that the characteristics of the property owners in eminent domain 
cases affect subsequent “reform efforts.” This study confirms Dana’s conclusion: As the 
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white percentage of a state’s population increases, so does the probability that the state 
enacted eminent domain reform.   
The model was less successful in explaining the substance or strength of these 
reforms in states that reacted to Kelo. None of the independent variables were 
significantly related to whether a state enacted strong or weak legislation. Again, these 
results were unexpected. It was anticipated that white, conservative, Republican states 
would have enacted strong as opposed to weak legislation. One possible explanation for 
the lack of statistically significant relationships in this model involves the construction 
of distinctions between strong and weak legislation. As discussed in the appendix, what 
constitutes strong and weak legislation is certainly a matter of debate. Perhaps, no 
provisions are in and of themselves “strong” or “weak” but that each piece of legislation 
must be evaluated independently according to its language and within the context of the 
entire body of state property law. 
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SUMMARY 
In summary, the preceding project found that the states did respond to the 
Justices’ suggestion in the majority opinion of Kelo v. City of New London. Three-fifths 
of the states “place[d] further restrictions on [their] exercise of the takings power” by 
enacting statutes or constitutional amendments (Legal Information Institute 2005). This 
project attributed the states’ response to the immediate, widespread criticism generated 
by the decision as well as its context within a nationwide property rights movement. 
Furthermore, both the U.S. Congress and public interest groups encouraged states to 
limit the use of eminent domain for economic development. 
Through the construction of a statistical model, this study then evaluated the 
effects of state demographics, ideological orientation, and partisan unity and 
composition on whether a state enacted legislation and the substance of the legislation 
enacted. Because of the Republican Party’s active role in the property rights movement, 
it was not surprising that states with unified Republican governments and high 
percentages of Republican U.S. Representatives were the most likely to enact legislation 
in response to Kelo. Because of the conservative character of the groups propelling the 
property rights movement, the absence of a statistically significant relationship between 
the conservatism of a state and whether it enacted legislation was unexpected. The 
strongest predictor of whether a state enacted legislation – the percentage white of the 
population – was also unanticipated; however, this discovery makes sense in the context 
of legal scholar David A. Dana’s theory that the characteristics of property owners in 
eminent domain cases affect public reaction and subsequent reform efforts.  
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Finally, none of the state characteristics explored in this study were able to 
predict whether a state enacted “strong” or “weak” legislation. One potential explanation 
for this finding involves the lack of a uniform and multidimensional legislation 
classification method.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table 5: Detailed State Reactions to Kelo 
State Statute 
Passed 
Governor 
Signed 
Gubernatorial 
Veto 
Overridden 
Date Governor 
Signed or 
Gubernatorial 
Veto Overridden 
Constitutional 
Amendment 
Passed for 
Placement  on 
2006 Ballot 
Percentage of Vote 
for Constitutional 
Amendment on 
2006 Ballot 
Alabama X X  05.08.03; 
06.04.25* 
  
Alaska X X  06.07.05   
Arizona       
Arkansas       
California       
Colorado X X  06.06.06   
Connecticut       
Delaware X X  05.07.21   
Florida X X  06.05.11 X 69.0 
Georgia X X  06.04.04 X 82.7 
Hawaii       
Idaho X X  06.03.21   
Illinois X X  06.07.28   
Indiana X X  06.03.24   
Iowa X  X 06.07.14   
Kansas X X  06.05.18   
Kentucky X X  06.03.28   
Louisiana     X 55.0 
Maine X X  06.04.13   
Maryland       
Massachusetts       
Michigan     X 80.1 
Minnesota X X  06.05.19   
Mississippi       
Missouri X X  06.07.13   
Montana       
Nebraska X X  06.04.13   
Nevada       
New Hampshire X X  06.06.23 X 85.7 
New Jersey       
New Mexico       
New York       
North Carolina X X  06.08.10   
North Dakota       
Ohio X X  05.11.16   
Oklahoma       
Oregon       
Pennsylvania X X  06.05.04   
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State Statute 
Passed 
Governor 
Signed 
Gubernatorial 
Veto 
Overridden 
Date Governor 
Signed or 
Gubernatorial 
Veto Overridden 
Constitutional 
Amendment 
Passed for 
Placement  on 
2006 Ballot 
Percentage of Vote 
for Constitutional 
Amendment on 
2006 Ballot 
Rhode Island       
South Carolina     X 86.0 
South Dakota X X  06.02.21   
Tennessee X X  06.06.05   
Texas X X  05.09.01   
Utah X X  06.03.21   
Vermont X X  06.04.14   
Virginia       
Washington       
West Virginia X X  06.04.05   
Wisconsin X X  06.03.29   
Wyoming       
*Alabama enacted statutes in both 2005 and 2006. 
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APPENDIX B 
“Strongest” and “Weaker” Legislation Distinctions Explanations 
Unfortunately, the NCSL does not discuss the relative effectiveness of its seven 
categories of legislation in protecting property owners from state and local governments’ 
exercise of eminent domain for economic development. However, the Institute for 
Justice (IJ), Timothy Sandefur of the Pacific Legal Foundation, and legal scholar David 
A. Dana have classified the legislation enacted in reaction to Kelo according to whether 
or not the statutes and constitutional amendments produced meaningful reform of 
eminent domain laws. The IJ, Sandefur, and Dana vary in what constitute strong and 
weak legislation; often, a state is classified as having enacted strong legislation by the IJ 
and weak legislation by Sandefur. However, a few trends are common to the IJ, 
Sandefur, and Dana.  
The IJ and Sandefur are concerned with redefining “blight” to emphasize 
detriment to public health or safety, to encompass only the most dangerous or extremely 
distressed property. The IJ writes: “Most abuses of eminent domain for private use occur 
because states’ definitions of blight are so broad and vague that they could apply to 
practically every neighborhood in the country.” (2007, 2) Sandefur expresses the similar 
concern that a vague definition of blight allows governments “to declare property 
blighted whenever officials believe it is failing to produce revenue at a level that they 
would like to see.” (2006, 19)  
The IJ and Dana are concerned with the explicit prohibition of eminent domain 
for economic development. The IJ asserts that the states that include “prohibition on 
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private development” have “the strongest reforms,” and Dana heralds Florida legislation 
which banned “condemnations based on both economic development and blight 
rationales.” (Dana 2006, 17; Institute for Justice 2007, 2) 
Considering the observations of the IJ, Sandefur, and Dana and the fact that Kelo 
surrounded the issue of exercising eminent domain for economic development, 
legislation that includes both the “prohibition for economic development” and “blight” 
provisions was classified as the “strongest” legislation. Legislation that contains just one 
of these provisions or any combination of the other five provisions was classified as 
“weaker” legislation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
38
APPENDIX C 
Table 6: State Measures for Variables 
State % Population 
White, Not 
Hispanic (2004) 
% Conservative 
Wright (2003) 
Republican 
Unified State 
Government 
(as of 2/2006) 
% Republican 
Representatives 
109th U.S. 
Congress  
Legislation 
Enacted 
Strength of 
Legislation  
Alabama 69.5 37 0 71.4286 1 1 
Alaska 66.9 * 1 100.0000 1 0 
Arizona 61.1 42.4 0 75.0000 0  
Arkansas 77.2 53.1 0 25.0000 0  
California 44.5 27.5 0 37.7358 0  
Colorado 72.5 26.5 0 57.1429 1 0 
Connecticut 75.9 29.6 0 60.0000 0  
Delaware 70.2 52.5 0 100.0000 1 0 
Florida 62.8 35.7 1 68.0000 1 1 
Georgia 60.2 41.9 1 53.8462 1 1 
Hawaii 23.3 * 0 0.0000 0  
Idaho 87.2 43 1 100.0000 1 1 
Illinois 66.2 31.7 0 47.3684 1 1 
Indiana 84.6 33.8 1 77.7778 1 1 
Iowa 91.7 39.7 0 80.0000 1 1 
Kansas 81.9 34.6 0 75.0000 1 0 
Kentucky 88.7 43.3 0 83.3333 1 1 
Louisiana 61.8 39.4 0 71.4286 1 0 
Maine 96.1 35.8 0 0.0000 1 1 
Maryland 59.8 40.9 0 25.0000 0  
Massachusetts 80.8 29.1 0 0.0000 0  
Michigan 78.1 32.8 0 60.0000 1 0 
Minnesota 86.7 29.1 0 50.0000 1 1 
Mississippi 59.9 44.6 0 50.0000 0  
Missouri 83.1 36.5 1 55.5556 1 1 
Montana 89.1 31.9 0 100.0000 0  
Nebraska 85.7 38.3 0 100.0000 1 1 
Nevada 61.2 33.8 0 66.6667 0  
New Hampshire 94.3 36.3 0 100.0000 1 1 
New Jersey 63.8 33.4 0 46.1538 0  
New Mexico 43.5 43.1 0 66.6667 0  
New York 61.1 28.5 0 31.0345 0  
North Carolina 68.6 35.8 0 53.8462 1 0 
North Dakota 91.1 32.6 1 0.0000 0  
Ohio 83.3 37 1 61.1111 1 0 
Oklahoma 72.9 37.7 0 80.0000 0  
Oregon 82 44 0 20.0000 0  
Pennsylvania 82.9 33.1 0 63.1579 1 1 
Rhode Island 80.5 23.7 0 0.0000 0  
South Carolina 65.6 44.3 1 66.6667 1 1 
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State % Population 
White, Not 
Hispanic (2004) 
% Conservative 
Wright (2003) 
Republican 
Unified State 
Government 
(as of 2/2006) 
% Republican 
Representatives 
109th U.S. 
Congress  
Legislation 
Enacted 
Strength of 
Legislation  
South Dakota 87.1 58.3 1 0.0000 1 0 
Tennessee 78.1 44.5 0 44.4444 1 1 
Texas 49.8 37.8 1 65.6250 1 0 
Utah 83.8 49.6 1 66.6667 1 0 
Vermont 96 27.2 0 0.0000 1 0 
Virginia 68.7 38.4 0 72.7273 0  
Washington  77.5 30.9 0 33.3333 0  
West Virginia 94.4 37.2 0 33.3333 1 1 
Wisconsin 86.2 39.4 0 50.0000 1 1 
Wyoming  88.6 23.6 0 100.0000 0  
*Wright ideology scores not available for Alaska and Hawaii.  
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APPENDIX D 
Property Rights Related Supreme Court Cases  
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982), the Court held that “a 
New York law requiring a landlord to permit a cable television company to install a 
cable over the roof and down the side of her building was a taking, notwithstanding the 
fact that the cable was installed by a third party and occupied only a trivial space on the 
building.” Loretto established that permanent, physical occupations by the government 
automatically constitute takings requiring the payment of compensation (Dana and 
Merrill 2002, 94). In Loretto, the Court began to move away from a focus on the parcel 
of property rights as a whole and toward an assessment of the impact of a regulation on a 
single right (in this case, the right of exclusion) (Kendall and Lord 1998, 563).  
In Hodel v. Irving (1987), the Court struck down a law that severely limited 
Indian inheritance rights because it “amount[ed] to virtually the abrogation of the right to 
pass on a certain type of property – the small undivided interest – to one’s heirs. In one 
form or another, the right to pass on property – to one’s family in particular – has been 
part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.” (Eagle 2001, 10) By 
declaring a taking where the government’s regulation only affected the right to dispose 
of property, the Court continued its movement away from a focus on the parcel of 
property rights as a whole and toward the protection of each individual right (Kendall 
and Lord 1998, 564).   
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987), the Court ruled that the 
Commission could not grant building permits to beachfront property owners with the 
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stipulation that they maintain a public walkway on their property. Nollan is considered 
one of two leading exactions decisions for it established the “nexus test”; according to 
the “nexus test,” there must be an “essential nexus” between the purpose of the condition 
and the purpose that would be served by prohibiting the proposed development (Dana 
and Merrill 2002, 118-222; Kendall and Lord 1998, 581). 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992), the Court ordered that the 
owner of a beachfront property be compensated after a state law stopped all new 
construction on the property because the law totally eliminated the land’s economic 
value. In Lucas, the Court established that when a government’s regulation renders a 
property valueless, it automatically constitutes a taking requiring the payment of 
compensation. With Lucas, the Court’s adoption of Epstein’s theory was complete; all 
the critical strands in the parcel of property rights – the rights to exclude, dispose, and 
now use property – were protected by the Takings Clause (Kendall and Lord 1998, 564).  
In Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), the Court ruled that the City of Tigard could 
not require property owners to forfeit parts of their land for public use in order to receive 
permits to develop the land. Dolan is the other of two leading exactions decisions for it 
established the “rough proportionality test”; according to the “rough proportionality 
test,” “to be constitutional, a development condition must have a nexus to the anticipated 
harms resulting from the development and be roughly proportionate” – that is to say, the 
reduction in social costs from the exaction must be roughly proportionate to the social 
costs attributable to the development (Dana and Merrill 2002, 222-224). 
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In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the 
Court declared that a moratorium on the development of properties in the Lake Tahoe 
Region was not a taking requiring compensation (Jones 2004). The Court recalled that a 
permanent deprivation of all use is a taking but that a temporary restriction causing a 
diminution in value is not, for the property will recover value when the prohibition is 
lifted. Thus, the Court construed the category of government regulations that escape 
categorical takings treatment to include even multi-year moratoria on land development 
instructing that such restrictions should be assessed under the ad hoc approach (Dana 
and Merrill 2002, 88 and 185). 
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APPENDIX E 
Groups Propelling the Property Rights Movement  
The Institute for Justice (IJ) describes itself as “the nation’s only libertarian 
public interest law firm.” The IJ was founded in 1991 by William Mellor, a Reagan 
Administration official, and Clint Bolick, a veteran of the Justice Department in the 
1980s and a former assistant to Justice Clarence Thomas (Kendall and Lord 1998, 542-
543). According to its mission statement, the IJ litigates “to secure economic liberty, 
school choice, private property rights, freedom of speech and other vital individual 
liberties and to restore constitutional limits on the power of government.” To advance 
these aims, the IJ hosts Policy Activist Seminars for practicing lawyers and educational 
programs for law students. In areas of the country where they are litigating, the IJ 
maintains active grassroots campaigns to “build public support and foster an ethos of 
economic liberty.” The IJ files frequent amicus curiae briefs on behalf of property 
owners in takings cases; often Richard Epstein pens these briefs (Hatcher 2005, 126-
130).  
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf 
of Susette Kelo on August 19, 2004. The PLF was founded in Sacramento in the early 
1970s by Ronald Zumbrun and Raymond Mombroisse, former assistants to President 
Reagan during his governorship. The PLF is the self-proclaimed oldest and largest 
public interest legal organization dedicated to property rights, limited government, and a 
balanced approach to environmental protection. It represents the beginning of nonprofit 
law firms devoted to right-wing causes. Today, the PLF’s strategies include: litigating 
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precedent-setting cases, legal research, public outreach, monitoring government 
administrative proceedings, preparation of legal briefs and oral arguments, moot court 
sessions, on-site meetings, and other related activities (Hatcher 2005, 124-126). The PLF 
has filed a brief in favor of the property owner in every important regulatory takings case 
that has been heard by the Supreme Court since the mid-1970s (Kendall and Lord 1998, 
541).  
The Mountain States Legal Foundation submitted an amicus curiae brief on 
behalf of Susette Kelo on December 2, 2004. The Mountain States Legal Foundation is a 
nonprofit, public interest law firm. “The right to own and use property” is one of the four 
principal purposes to which the Mountain States Legal Foundation is dedicated. The 
Mountain States Legal Foundation’s President and Chief Legal Officer William Perry 
Pendley served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy and Minerals of the 
Department of Interior during the Reagan Administration. Several of the Mountain 
States Legal Foundation staff attorneys were presidents of Federalist Society chapters 
while in law school (Mountain States Legal Foundation 2007). 
The Property Rights Foundation of America filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf 
of Susette Kelo both on August 23, 2004 and December 3, 2004. “The Property Rights 
Foundation of America is a national, grassroots, New York-based non-profit 
organization dedicated to the right to own and use private property in all its fullness as 
guaranteed in the United States Constitution.” The Property Rights Foundation is best 
known for its flagship publication Positions on Property which began in 1994. This 
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publication was the first to compile all the land-use regulations and pre-zoning plans in a 
state (New York) (Property Rights Foundation of America 2007). 
The Cato Institute submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Susette Kelo on 
December 2, 2004. The Cato Institute, a non-profit public policy research foundation, 
was begun in 1977. According to its mission, “the Cato Institute seeks to broaden the 
parameters of public policy debate to allow consideration of the traditional American 
principles of limited government, individual liberty, free markets and peace.” The Cato 
Institute is engaged in legal issues surrounding the Fifth Amendment, particularly 
property rights, eminent domain, and takings. Richard Epstein is an adjunct scholar at 
the Cato Institute. Roger Pilon, Vice President for Legal Affairs and a “Cato scholar” in 
the area of property rights, held five senior posts in the Reagan Administration, 
including at the Departments of State and Justice (Cato Institute 2007).  
The attorneys who litigate on behalf of property rights for the IJ, PLF, and other 
legal foundations are often drawn from the Federalist Society. The Federalist Society 
was created in response to concerns in the late 1970s and early 1980s about the lack of 
conservatives in the legal academy. The Federalist Society is a “group of legal 
academics and practitioners seeking to understand the way in which the economic 
analysis of law can enable sound judicial interpretation.” At present, the Federalist 
Society has membership in excess of 5,000 law students and 20,000 professionals 
(Hatcher 2005, 134-138). In addition to linking lawyers who wish to litigate on behalf of 
conservative and libertarian causes with legal foundations, the Federalist Society hosts  
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many training seminars for law students, attorneys, and judges that discuss conservative 
and libertarian views on topics including property rights (Kendall and Lord 1998, 546-
547).  
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   College of Liberal Arts Dean’s Honor Roll 
 
ASKO Europa Stiftung Summer European Academy Scholarship 
   Texas A&M Ella C. McFadden Four-Year Academic Scholarship 
    
   Pi Sigma Alpha National Political Science Honor Society 
   Golden Key International Honor Society  
   The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi 
   Phi Eta Sigma Honor Society 
    
 
ACADEMIC   University Undergraduate Research Fellows Program 
ACTIVITIES  University Scholar  
   Academy for Future International Leaders 
   The Summer European Academy Study Abroad Program  
   Cornerstone Freshman Liberal Arts Honors Learning Community 
 
 
WORK   U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs  
EXPERIENCE  Texas A&M P.P.I.P. Intern, Summer 2006 
    
Vinson & Elkins, LLP 
    Student Intern, Summer 2005 
    
Encysive Pharmaceuticals 
    Student Intern, Summer 2004 
